研讨论文
《Marginal Reputation》by Daniel Luo & Alexander Wolitzky ，Theoretical Economics 2024
主讲人
王岑文（伟德国际victor·1946源自中国公共财政与政策研究院研究生）
内容简介
This paper studies reputation when a long-run player's (LRP)private signals are unobserved by short-run players (SRPs), whoonly see actions. The LRP can secure her Stackelberg payoff ifthis strategy is "confound-defeating"-uniquely optimal amongstrategies with the same action marginal, equivalent to being theunique solution to an optimal transport problem. This preventsrational LRPs from playing observationally similar but differentgames,this means monotonestrategies.In supermodularstrategies. The results provide reputational foundations fordeterrence, trust, and (with small lying costs) monotone Bayesianpersuasion, even with unobserved states.
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
时间
5月27日 (18:20-20:00）
线下地址
学术会堂712
活动对象
伟德国际1946学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
伟德国际1946
END
撰稿：尹训东
编辑：沈嘉怡
审核：王颖
